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Thabo Meli Revisited:
The Pernicious Effects of
Result-driven Decisions
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract Despite the hackneyed expression that 'judges should interpret
the law and not make it', the fact remains that there is some scope within
the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common
law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, hut
only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers
doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power
entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict
application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their
personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural
consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose
respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of
criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the
case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly
believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict
application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated
the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the
discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in
its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but
the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly
identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the
principles relating thereto.
Keywords Causation; Temporal coincidence; Separation of powers
The doctrine of separation of powers' is as old as it is important. The
general responsibilities of the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of government are so well known that any court would probably be
derelict in refusing to take judicial notice ^ of them. Suffice it to say that
the legislative branch bears overriding responsibility for enacting laws
by way of legislation, although it is undeniably true that in common law
jurisdictions, the power of the legislative branch to enact legislation is
* Associate Professor, Deakin University School of Law; e-mail: ken.arenson@
deakin.edu.au.
1 For an explanation of the separation of powers principle, see generally J. E. Novak
and R. D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 4th edn (West: New York, 1991) 126-8.
2 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153; Bridlington Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity
Board [1965] 1 All ER 978; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s. 144 and equivalent Uniform
Evidence Act in the remaining Australian jurisdictions. These cases represent
instances in which the appropriate standard for taking judicial notice of a fact is
when it is so well known or notorious that every reasonable person is presumed to
be aware of it. In what are termed as code jurisdictions in Australia such as the
Northern Territory, ACT, Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, all law
exists is in statutory form: K. J. Arenson, M. Bagaric and R Gillies, Australian
Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2011) 17-19 (hereafter Australian Criminal Law in the
Common Law Jurisdictions).
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augmented by the inherent power of the judiciary to develop the
common law incrementally.'
As long as Marbury v Madison,'^ a watershed case decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, Marshall CJ opined that 'it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is'.' While this time-honoured truism has rarely, if ever,
been disputed by legal scholars, it requires little imagination to under-
stand that a very fine line exists between incrementally developing the
common law and usurping the power of the legislature. One of the most
common and insidious examples of the latter occurs when judges de-
velop the common law in a manner that is driven more by their desire
to achieve what they consider to be a fair and just result in a particular
case than their obligation to develop and apply the common law. When
this occurs, both the law and the judiciary that is entrusted with its
construction and application are deservingly brought into disrepute.
In order to illustrate this point, the discussion to follow will focus on
an English decision* that was decided on what can only be described as
a highly questionable and tortured construction of the common law
doctrine of temporal coincidence.^ In addition, the discussion will
demonstrate that unbeknownst to the Privy Council, a correct applica-
tion of the extant English and Australian law would have permitted it to
reach the same result without resorting to the type of sophistry noted
above.
Temporal coincidence
Briefly stated, the doctrine of temporal coincidence applies only to
crimes of mens reaf that is, crimes which require the prosecution to
prove that the accused acted with one or more mental states that
contemplate some type of harm or condition that transcends the min-
imal state of mind necessary to prove a voluntary act or an omission to
act (where the law imposes a duty to act) on the part of the accused.'
The doctrine of temporal coincidence requires the prosecution not only
to prove the mens rea element of a crime, but its existence at the time of
3 The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia noted that '[i]n many instances the
generality of the statutory language is deliberate and allows the courts to develop a
body of law to fill the gaps'; Tektra Corp. Ltd v Tretoar (2000) 102 FCR 595 at 603.
See also Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 309: 'In modern times, the
function of the courts in developing the common law has been freely
acknowledged' (Brennan J, citing Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC
1001 at 1021; Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556 at
563; Geelong Harbor Trust Commissioners v Cibbs Bright & Co. [1974] AC 810 at
820-1).
4 5 US (1 Crancb) 137 (1803).
5 Ibid, at 177.
6 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228 (hereafter Thabo Meti).
1 Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 29-30.
8 For a thorough discussion of mens rea, see P. Gillies, Criminal Law, 4th edn (LBC
Information Services: 1997) 46-79 (hereafter Criminal Law).
9 Ibid, at 48. For an act or omission to be a voluntary one, it must be the result of a
conscious decision to either move a portion of one's body or to refrain from doing
so: at 29-30, 37-39. See also R v Russell [1933] VLR 59; R v MacDonald [1904] St R
Qd 151.
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the accused's voluntary act or omission upon which the prosecution
seeks to predicate criminal liability.'°
For example, suppose that D runs over V who has unexpectedly
jumped in front of D's car in order to commit suicide. Assume further
that V does not die immediately, but lingers in hospital for seven days
before succumbing. Also assume that in the interim period, D discovers
that V is a convicted paedophile and states in front of the hospital staff,
'I want that man dead'. Does D intend that V will die? Yes. Would it
make any sense that D should be convicted of murder under these facts?
No, because D's intention that V should die for his past crimes did not
temporally coincide with D's volitional act of pressing his foot on the
accelerator or steering the car in V's direction.
On the other hand, if D, knowing of V's past, deliberately runs a stop
sign in order to kill V who has the right of way, D's intention to kill V
exists at the time of his volitional act of applying full pressure to the
accelerator. Under these facts it is entirely reasonable and justifiable that
D should be convicted of murder. Here, there is no question that
temporal coincidence exists between D's mens rea and his relevant
voluntary act. It is apparent, therefore, that the doctrine of temporal
coincidence serves a very legitimate purpose in ensuring that the attri-
bution of criminal responsibility for offences of mens rea requires some
degree of moral culpability for one's conduct."
It should also be noted that with the exception of so-called 'situ-
ational offences','^ the prosecution must prove, in order to secure a
conviction, a voluntary act or an omission to act where there was a legal
10 Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 29-30.
11 Criminal Law, above n. 8 at 42-5. Although the writer was unable to locate any case
or academic authority to support this proposition, the underlying rationale for the
doctrine of temporal coincidence appears from examples such as these to be based
on the notion that the attribution of criminal liability is inextricably tied to the
notion of moral culpability. It would be difficult to find the presence of such moral
culpability with offences of mens where the mens rea does not coincide temporally
with the act or omission upon which liability is sought to be predicated.
12 Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 27-8; Criminal
Law, above n. 8 at 28. In explaining the nature of situational type offences. Gillies
writes:
'Some offences are of such a nature that their actus reus consists of nothing more
than D's relationship with, or other implication in, a static situation. Such
offences have been termed "situational offences". The classic example is the
offence of being the licensee of prescribed premises on which is found a person
during prohibited hours, who is there for an unlawful purpose. Others include
being an occupant of a place used for unlawful gaming, or for the purpose of
prostitution.
These offences are generally of a minor nature, and have been created by
statute. They do not require proof of conduct on the part of D, whether it be
activity or inactivity. No doubt the typical "situation" will have arisen because of
D's activity or inactivity, but the actus reus does not extend to these acts and thus
they will not need to be proven. In short, they are not part of the offence of this
type.
It may be that situational offences represent an exception to the general rule
that D must act (or fail to act) voluntarily, because their actus reus does not
include conduct on D's part. For example, the licensee who is asleep while
another person is on the premises during prohibited hours for an unlawful
purpose is, notwithstanding the licensee's unconscious state, prima facie liable
for the offence of this type.' (Ibid, at 32-3; Footnotes omitted.)
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duty to act on the part of the accused." There is, however, a rebuttable
presumption of sorts that all relevant acts or omissions are voluntary,
subject to the proviso that should evidence arise during the course of
trial that raises a question as to the voluntariness of the same, the
prosecution will be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
relevant act or omission was indeed voluntary.'''
The Privy Council's decision in Thabo Meli
In Thabo Meli,^^ the appellant and three cohorts lured the deceased into
a hut, plied him with alcohol and then struck him in the head with an
intention to cause his death.'* Mistakenly believing that the deceased
was already dead, the appellant removed the body to a shallow cliff
where it was then rolled over and the scene altered to make it appear as
though an accident had occurred.'^ According to the medical evidence,
however, the deceased was alive at the time he was rolled over the cliff
and the blow he received to the head would not have been sufficient to
cause his death; rather, the evidence showed that death was instead
caused by exposure to the elements.'* On appeal, the appellant argued
that the initial voluntary act of striking the deceased in the head, though
accompanied by an intention to kill, " was not the legal cause of death.^°
Moreover, it was argued that the volitional act of rolling the deceased's
body over the cliff and thereby exposing it to the elements, an act that
was unaccompanied by the necessary mens rea for murder, was the legal
cause of death.^' Thus, the appellant argued, the conviction was not
sustainable for want of temporal coincidence between the requisite mens
rea for murder and the volitional act that actually caused the deceased's
death."
In dismissing the appeal, the Privy Council was apparently receptive
to the argument that it was indeed the second voluntary act of the
appellant in rolling the body over the cliff and exposing it to the
13 Criminal Law, above n. 8 at 28. There is a rebuttable presumption that any relevant
act or omission is a voluntary one. Jf, however, evidence arises that raises a
question as to the voluntariness of a relevant act or omission, the ultimate burden
of proving voluntariness beyond reasonable doubt rests with the prosecution.
14 Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 215-16.
15 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228.
16 Ibid, at 228.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, at 229.
19 It is well settled in Victoria and elsewhere that an intention to kill is a sufficient
mens rea for the crime of murder; Rv Jakac [1961] VR 367 at 368; R v Terry [1955]
VLR 114 at 115; Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55; R v Vickers [1972] 2 QB 644. See also
Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 42; Criminal
Law, above n. 8 at 629.
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elements that was the cause of death, and further, because the appellant
mistakenly believed that the deceased was already dead, he could not
have then acted with the requisite temporal coincidence to be convicted
of murder." As it is well settled that a voluntary act consists of a
consciously willed muscular movement,^" it is apparent that there were
a litany of voluntary acts on the part of the appellant without which the
deceased would not have ultimately died when and as he did." Thus, as
will be addressed below, it is more accurate to depict the result in Thabo
Meli as one that involves the correct application of principles of legal
causation than those of temporal coincidence. Nonetheless, and ostens-
ibly accepting the appellant's argument that the conviction could not
withstand a straightforward application of the doctrine of temporal
coincidence, the Privy Council opined that it was acceptable to regard
two or more voluntary acts as one continuous series of acts intercon-
nected by a common purpose to kill and dispose of the body;^ ^ that is to
say that two or more voluntary acts may be viewed as one voluntary act
if they are somehow connected by a common purpose as in the present
case."
Taken to its logical conclusion, this has the practical effect of emascu-
lating the doctrine of temporal coincidence beyond recognition. The
reason for this is that many crimes are predicated on one volitional act
by an accused or his or her accomplices that typically lead to many
others that are similarly interconnected by a common purpose such as
evading detection, apprehension and the like. In the writer's view, the
Privy Council's decision represents a classic example of result-driven
decision-making of the type referred to at the beginning of this article.
To be sure, it would strain credulity to treat the Privy Council's decision
as anything other than a blatant example of legislating from the bench in
order to achieve what the justices perceived to be a just result. The Privy
Council's decision should be seen for exactly what it is: a crossing of that
all-important line between the courts' inherent power and duty to
develop the common law incrementally and usurping the power en-
trusted to Parliament to legislate for the common good and, in so doing,
evincing an utter disdain for well-settled legal precedent.
In analysing the Privy Council's reasoning in Thabo Meli, it is apparent
that the same result could have been achieved through a correct and
23 Above n. 20 at 230.
24 Rv Butcher [1986] VR 43 at 52, 56; Ryan v R (1967) 40 AUR 488 at 492. See also
Criminal Law. above n. 8 at 28-30.
25 R. Perkins and R. Boyce, Criminal Law. 3rd edn (Foundation Press: 1982) 773. This
point is exemplified in the fact that he term 'legal cause' denotes a cause to which
the 'law will attribute legal responsibility for a result': Royall v The Queen (1991 ) 172
CLR 378 at 441 (McHugb J); at 387-8 (Mason CJ).
26 [1954] WLR 228 at 230.
27 Ibid, at 230.
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straightforward application of both English and Australian common law
principles. Was there a volitional act or omission to act on the part of the
accused? The blow to the deceased's head that was inflicted by the
appellant was, as noted above,^^ presumptively volitional in the absence
of evidence that would raise a genuine issue as to voluntariness.^' On
the facts of Thabo Meli, there was no evidence to suggest that the
accused's blow to the head of the deceased was anything other than the
result of a willed muscular movement or, as it is often described, a
conscious decision on the part of the accused to move a part of his
body.'° Was the voluntary act of striking the deceased in the head the
legal cause of his death?
Causation
In answering this question, one must delve into the murky waters of the
principles governing legal causation in criminal prosecutions." Though
a lengthy treatise would be required to do justice to any discussion of the
operation and scope of the principles governing legal causation in the
context of criminal prosecutions, suffice it to say for present purposes
that with the exceptions of accessorial liability'^ and the so-called 'situ-
ational offences' noted earlier," the prosecution is always required to
prove the existence of a legal causal nexus between the accused's
voluntary act(s) or omission(s) and the actus reus elements of the of-
fence; that is, the elements that do not require proof that the accused
acted with a state of mind that contemplates something more than what
is merely required for an act or omission to be regarded as voluntary.'"•
In order to prove this causal nexus, the prosecution must prove: (a) that
the relevant voluntary act or omission was a but-for cause of the actus
reus elements to the extent that but-for the relevant voluntary act or
omission, the actus reus elements would not have come into being when
28 Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 27-8; Criminal
Law, above n. 8 at 28, 32-3.
29 Ibid.
30 R V Butcher [1986] VR 43 at 52, 56.
31 For a comprehensive exposition of the principles governing the doctrine of legal
causation in Australia as well as the USA, see K. J. Arenson, 'Causation in the
Criminal Law: A Search for Doctrinal Consistency' (1996) 20(4) Criminal Law
Journal 189.
32 Criminal Law, above n. 8 at 157-8.
33 Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 29-30.
34 Criminal Law, above n. 8 at 48. But see Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
[1968] 3 All ER 442. In Fagan, the English Court of Appeal held in unambiguous
terms that where the common law crime of assault is concerned, liability cannot be
predicated on a mere omission to act (at 442). Although the Court of Appeal did
not expound further on this declaration, presumably it was referring to voluntary
omissions to act where there is a legal duty to act.
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and as they did;'' and (b) the absence of a novus actus interveniens^^ or a
superseding event." Although the latter two terms are used inter-
changeably in the context of legal causation in the criminal law, for
convenience purposes the term 'superseding' cause will be used
throughout the remainder of this article.
An event will be adjudged as 'superseding' if it occurred during the
time interval between the accused's relevant voluntary act or omission
and the completion of the actus reus elements of the offence, it is itself a
but-for cause of the actus reus elements, and is so significant that it,
rather than the accused's relevant act or omission, should be regarded as
the legal cause of such elements.'* When an event rises to the level of
'superseding', its legal effect is to sever the causal nexus between the
accused's relevant voluntary act or omission and the actus reus elements
in that the accused is not held criminally responsible for any conse-
quences that occur subsequent to its intervention." It is important to
note, however, that the event severs the causal chain in only a public
policy sense because even though the accused's volitional act or omis-
sion is a but-for cause of the actus reus elements, the public policy interest
35 Perkins and Boyce, above n. 25; Royalt v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 440. For
an explanation of the rare exception to the but-for requirement of legal causation
in the context of tort law, see March v Stramare Fty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, the
leading High Court decision on legal causation in the civil context. In that decision.
Mason CJ opined that 'the "but-for" test gives rise to a well-known difficulty in
cases where there are two or more acts or events which would each be sufficient to
bring about the plaintiff's injury' (at 516). An uncritical and blind application of a
simple but-for test in this type of situation would may well lead to the unpalatable
result that neither act or event would be considered as the legal cause of the harm
contemplated by the civil wrong at issue. Simply stated, neither act or event would
satisfy the test because one could not say that but for any one of the acts or events
taken in isolation, the harm would not have occurred when and as it did and, thus,
none of the acts or events would satisfy the but-for test and there would be no
culpable party. It is rarely the case, however, that one can say that the harm would
not have occurred when and as it did if one or more of the acts or events had not
occurred. This exception, therefore, is so rarely invoked that one can state that for
all practical purposes, the but-for test is an essential component of legal causation.
Though the courts have never stated or implied that the test for legal causation is
identical in the criminal and civil spheres, tbere is no reason in logic or principle
that this exception should not apply with equal force in criminal cases. See also
D. B. Dobbs, P. W. Keeton, R. Keeton and D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th
edn (West: 1984) 266-9. The but-for requirement is also referred to as the
requirement of 'cause in fact: Perkins and Boyce, above n. 25 at 777.
36 Royall v The Queen (1991 ) 172 CLR 378 at 398-9 (Brennan J); at 448-51 (McHugh
J). For a treatise devoted exclusively to the operation, scope of the term novus actus
interveniens, see H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1985). In Royall, the novus actus interveniens doctrine of
causation was all but rejected in the criminal law sphere as only two of the seven
High Court justices even mentioned it. Moreover, neither justice undertook to
explain how the doctrine applies in the civil context: at 398-9 (Brennan J); at
448-51 (McHugh J).
37 Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 639 at [16], [28]. Perkins and Boyce, above n. 25 at
794. See also J. A. McLaughlin,'Proximate Cause' (1925) 39HarvLRev 149 at
155. In /? V Hallett [1969] SASR 141, the Supreme Court of South Australia
employed the term 'supervening factor' rather than superseding cause: at 149.
38 Criminal Law, above n. 8 at 33-4, 608; Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law
Jurisdictions, above n. 2 at 51.
39 McLaughlin, above n. 37; Perkins and Boyce, above n. 25 at 770, 774-7, 781-2.
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in confining the accused's criminal liability within reasonable limits'*"
constitutes the major underpinning of the law's refusal to impose liabil-
ity for consequences that occur subsequent to the intervention of the
superseding event.'"
The so-called rule of intended consequences represents an important
limitation on the notion that certain events should be seen as such a
dominant cause of a result that they, rather than the accused's volitional
act or omission, should be regarded as the legal cause of the same.*^
Under this rule, if the accused intended the actual result of his or her
relevant act or omission which was a but-for cause of that result, the law
disregards any event or events that would otherwise have been super-
seding and the accused's volitional act or omission will be regarded as
the legal cause of the result.*' Thus, the fact that the ultimate harm may
have occurred in a bizarre or completely different manner than the
accused anticipated, will be of no consequence insofar as the application
of the rule of intended consequences is concerned. This rule is entirely
consonant with the view espoused by McHugh J in Royall v The Queenf*
namely, that the attribution of causal responsibility is inextricably
intertwined with the notion of moral culpability, and one should not be
seen as morally culpable for results that were neither intended nor
reasonably foreseeable.*' To define a 'superseding' event, however, is to
beg the question of when an event will be regarded as such a significant
but-for cause of the actus reus elements that the law will regard it as
superseding. Regrettably, there is no simple answer to this important
question and thus far the Australian courts have applied at least six
different tests** in directing juries on the law to be applied in making this
determination.*^
Returning to our analysis of Thabo Meli, it is the writer's view that on
the facts presented, there were only two events that would have war-
ranted a direction to the jury on the question of whether they were
superseding and, if so, which test(s) should have been applied in making
these determinations: the accused's act of rolling the deceased's body
40 (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 390-1 (Brennan J); 429-30 (McHugh J); Perkins and Boyce.
above n. 25 at 770, 11^6] McLaughlin, above n. 37.
41 McLaughlin, above n. 37; Perkins and Boyce, above n. 25 at 770, 114-1, 781-2.
Another rationale for allowing the superseding event to sever the accused's liability
in this sense is discussed below. In particular, it was McHugh J's view in Royall v The
Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378 that one should not be seen as liable for events that
were neither intended nor reasonable foreseeable (at 450). As will be seen below,
there is one very important exception to the rule that a superseding event severs
the causal chain so as to absolve the accused of liability for any harm that ensues
after the superseding event comes into operation.
42 (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 392 (Mason CJ); at 400 (Brennan J); at 411 (Dean and
Dawson JJ); at 452 (McHugh). This rule also applies in the UK: R v Michael (1840)
169 All ER 48.
43 R V Demirian [1989] VR 97 at 113.
44 (1991) 172 CLR 378.
45 Ibid, at 448 (McHugh J).
46 Ibid. McHugh J's opinion alludes to the operating and substantial test, natural
consequences test, novus actus interveniens test, take your victims as you find them
test, reasonable foresight test and the proportionality test adopted in Royall by
Deane. Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ (at 424).
47 Ibid.
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over the shallow cliff; and the advent of the weather elements which,
according to the medical evidence, was the actual cause of death. Under
the existing Australian common law doctrine,** these events were of an
entirely different character and, therefore, required the jury to apply a
different set of criteria in making its findings. Because the Australian
common law principles governing the doctrine of legal causation in the
criminal law sphere are so unsettled at this juncture, it would require
another lengthy article to address this issue adequately insofar as the
accused's act of rolling the deceased's body over the cliff is concerned.
Although there is no authoritative guidance on which of the available
tests, if any, the jury should have been directed to apply, the reasonable
foresight of consequences test enunciated by McHugh J in Royall v The
Queen'^'^ would have been the most appropriate.'"
Specifically, McHugh J commenced his judgment by agreeing in part
with his brethren that satisfying the but-for test is never, by itself, a
sufficient basis upon which to attribute legal responsibility to an act or
omission of the accused." McHugh J also agreed with other justices that
there is an element of common sense in assigning causal responsibility
and that juries need not be told that the question is a scientific or
philosophical one." His Honour further opined that when the putative
superseding event is an act or omission of either the alleged victim or
that of a third party (ostensibly one who sustains or causes another to
sustain injury in an attempt to aid the alleged victim), something more
than a mere common-sense approach is needed."
McHugh J then opined that tort and criminal law principles of legal
causation should be identical as they are not only designed to further the
same basic interests,''' but the appropriate test to be applied to such acts
or omissions is whether they would have been foreseeable to a reason-
able person in the position of the accused." If so, the jury should have
been instructed that they were not to be regarded as superseding events
that served to mythically sever the causal chain. Conversely, if the acts
or omissions would not have been foreseeable to a reasonable person in
the accused's position, and in the absence of a successful application of the
rule of intended consequences, the jury should have been instructed along
the exact opposite lines that the accused's act or omission had severed
the causal chain as a matter of public policy, thereby relieving the
accused of responsibility for any consequences that ensued after the
superseding event intervened. As there was no dispute that the accused
48 With regard to the act of the accused in rolling the body over the cliff, the writer
believes that there is no authority that clearly enunciates what criterion or criteria
must be applied in making this determination. Under the English common law
doctrine of causation, the jury should have been directed to apply the novus actus
interveniens test to both putative superseding events; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R
279 at 288-9 (Goff U).
49 (1991) 172 CLR 378 at 429.
50 Ibid, at 429-31.
51 Ibid, at 423.
52 Ibid, at 423-4.
53 Ibid, at 424.
54 Ibid, at 428-9.
55 Ibid, at 429.
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acted with the intention of killing the deceased, the rule of intended
consequences would have been applicable under both English and
Australian law with the result that the jury should have been directed to
ignore the putative superseding events and find that the accused's
voluntary act of striking the deceased in the head was the legal cause of
death.
It Is noteworthy that although McHugh J favoured a test of reason-
able foresight of consequences in instances where the putative super-
seding event was an act or omission of the alleged victim or a third
party,'* he did not opine on whether the same test should be applied to
acts or omissions of the accused. McHugh J's omission on this point is of
great importance in cases such as Thabo Meli in which an act of the
accused is arguably a superseding event. McHugh J's failure either to
include or exclude the accused's acts or omissions from this test might be
explicable on the basis that the putative superseding event in Royall v
The Queen was the victim's decision to deliberately jump out of the
bathroom window of the sixth floor fiat in which she and her boyfriend
were cohabita ting at the time.'^ On the other hand, McHugh J's test was
inclusive of acts or omissions of third parties despite the fact that no act
or omission of a third party was alleged to constitute a superseding event
in Royall v The Queen.
This suggests, therefore, that McHugh J's failure to include the
accused's acts or omissions was by design and not merely an oversight.
If that is correct, on what basis were they excluded? Was McHugh J wary
of the possibility that an informed and clever accused might manu-
facture an act or omission that might satisfy the criterion of being
unforeseeable to a reasonable person in his or her position? Is it plaus-
ible that any jury would find that an accused's act or omission was
unforeseeable to a reasonable person in his or her position? If not, is
there any reason in logic or principle for excluding the accused's acts or
omissions from the purview of this test? If such acts or omissions were
excluded by design, what test, if any, should be applied to the such acts
or omissions?
In the writer's view, the most likely explanation for McHugh J's
omission is that it was a mere oversight that occurred in the context of
a case in which there was no putative superseding act or omission on the
part of the accused. If the omission was a mere oversight and the
reasonable foresight of consequences test is applied to the appellant's act
of rolling the deceased's body over the cliff, it is all but certain that a jury
would find that it is quite foreseeable that the appellant, believing he
had committed a murder, would attempt to dispose of the body in a
manner that would make it appear as though the death was accidental.
Thus, the accused's act of rolling the body over the cliff would not rise to
the level of a superseding event. In any event, as noted above, the rule
of intended consequences would have precluded the act from breaking
56 Above n. 49.
57 Ibid, at 431-2.
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the causal chain regardless of whatever determination might have made
under the reasonable foresight of consequences test.
As far as which direction should have be given to the jury in regard to
its determination of whether the advent of the weather in causing death
should have severed the causal chain, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of South Australia in i? v Hallett^^ provides significant Australian
authority on this question. In Hallett,^"^ the appellant was convicted of
murder after the jury rejected his claim that he had acted in self-defence
in striking the deceased in the head as a means of repelling the decea-
sed's unwelcome sexual advances.*" The appellant gave further evi-
dence that following the blow to the head, he left the deceased face
down on the beach with the tide out and in an unconscious state before
walking away.*' Although the appellant apparently believed that the
deceased would soon regain consciousness," he ultimately died of
drowning when he failed to do so before the tide came in. On appeal, the
appellant claimed that his murder conviction should be quashed on the
ground that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on the question of
whether the incoming tide constituted a 'supervening'*' event that
absolved the accused of murder or any other homicide. In particular, this
argument was predicated on medical evidence that the deceased died of
drowning in shallow water after the tide had come in.*'*
In dismissing the appeal, the court significantiy referred to this case as
an 'exposure'*' type scenario, perhaps implying that it was articulating a
rule of law to be applied whenever the alleged superseding event is a
natural event or what is often termed an Act of God,** as in cases where
the putative intervening event is a tidal wave, lightning bolt, volcano,
tornado, hurricane and the like.*^
In a rather confusing opinion, the court did not take issue with the
trial judge's direction that satisfying the but-for test was an essential,
though not necessarily sufficient element in proving legal causation.**
The court then referred to and provided examples of what it described as
the 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' operation of natural forces of the type
noted above.*' In opining that the former would not be sufficient to
sever the causal chain, although the latter would,^° it is apparent that
the court was adopting the ordinary/extraordinary distinction as the
correct test to be applied by juries in natural force or Act of God cases
such as Hallett.
58 [1969] SASR 141. As indicated in n. 49, in the UK the novus actus interveniens test
would be applied in making this determination.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, at 143, 157.
61 Ibid, at 144, 146.
62 Ibid, at 145.
63 Ibid, at 147-8.
64 Ibid, at 142, 147.
65 Ibid, at 149.
66 Ibid, at 146.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, at 149-51.
69 Ibid, at 150.
70 Ibid. This conclusion is, of course, subject to the rule of intended consequences in
spite of the court's rather conspicuous failure to so much as mention the rule.
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Surprisingly, however. Bray CJ, Bright and Mitchell JJ concluded
their opinion by quoting a passage from Lord Parker's judgment in jR v
Smith^^ that is now known as the 'operating and substantial cause' test.
In enunciating this test. Lord Parker wrote:
It seems to the court that if at the time of death the original wound is still
an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can be properly said
to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause is also operating.
Only if it can be said that the original wounding is merely the setting in
which another cause operates can it be said that the death does not result
from the wound. Putting it another way, only if the second cause is so
overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of the history
can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound.'^
Though Lord Parker's 'operating and substantial' test has often been
cited with approval as the appropriate test to be applied in determining
whether an event rises to the level of a superseding,^' the writer's view
is that in cases such as Hallett,^'' Smith,^^ Evans and Gardiner (No. 2)7^
Blaue''' and no doubt others, this perplexing and rather amorphous test
was not the rule of law that was actually applied in determining the
outcome.^* Though the High Court has yet to authoritatively rule on
exactly which test should have been used in directing the jury in Hallett,
the judgment in Hallett, when viewed in its entirety, strongly suggests
that in cases where the alleged superseding event is an Act of God, it is
71 Rv Smith [1959] 2 QB 35.
72 rbid. at 42 (emphasis added).
73 Ibid.; R v Evans and Gardiner (No. 2) [1976] VR 523 at 529; R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR
1411 at 1418-19.
74 [1969] SASR 141.
75 [1959] 2 QB 35.
76 [1976] VR 523.
77 [1975] 1 WLR 1411.
78 In each of these cases, the operating and substantial cause test was indeed cited, but
as explained in the discussion of i? v Hallett [1969] SASR 141 above, the test was
not actually applied or explained. In Rv Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411, to cite another
example, this test was cited with apparent approval early in Lawton U's judgment,
but later in the judgment his Lordship made it quite clear that the case was actually
decided under the longstanding principle that we take our victims as we find them.
Lawton LJ opined that '[i]t has long been the policy of the law that those who use
violence on other people must take their victims as they find them. This in our
judgment means tfie whole man, not just the physical man. It does not lie in the
mouth of the assailant to say that the victim's religious beliefs, which inhibited him
from accepting certain kinds of treatment, were unreasonable. The question for
decision is what caused her death. The answer is the stab wound. The fact that the
victim refused to stop this end corning about did not break the causal connection
between the act and death' (at 1414); see also R v Bingapore (1975) 11 SASR 469;
R V Holland (1841) 2 Mood R 351; 174 ER 313. In R v Evans and Gardiner (No. 2)
[1976] VR 523 at 528-9 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Viaoria, though
extolling the virtues of Lord Parker's formulation, was conspicuous in its failure to
explain what the confusing language actually meant and appeared merely to cite
the passage as a way of expressing a legal conclusion that was unsupported by any
legal reasoning. Moreover, in Royall v The Queen (1991) 178 CLR 378, the leading
High Court decision on causation thus far in the criminal sphere, McHugh J not
only rejected the test, but severely criticised it as coming perilously close to
reducing legal causation to a mere but-for test (at 429). McHugh J concluded that
the word 'operating' had been construed as denoting nothing more than a simple
application of the but-for test, while the word 'substantial' had been construed to
mean something more than de minimis.
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appropriate to use the ordinary/extraordinary test whereby juries would
be directed that it is only in cases where the event can [airly be described
as an extraordinary operation of natural forces that it will sever the
causal nexus between the accused's voluntary act or omission and the
actus reus elements of the offence. Though the Supreme Court of South
Australia did not expressly address this question, this approach is very
similar to, if not the same as the tort-like reasonable foresight of conse-
quences test enunciated by McHugh J in Royall v The Queen. Whether
this is the correct view or not, and assuming arguendo that an Australian
court would use the operating and substantial cause test as the Supreme
Court of South Australia purported to do at the conclusion of its judg-
ment, there is no basis upon which to justify a finding that the weather
elements in Thabo Meli were any more significant than the incoming tide
in Hallett in bringing about the death of the deceased. In any event, the
rule of intended consequences would have required the jury to ignore
their effect and find that the accused's intentional blow to the head was
the legal cause of death.
Having demonstrated that Thabo Meli is a case that turned primarily
on principles of legal causation rather than the doctrine of temporal
coincidence, it is safe to conclude with reasonable certainty that the
accused's act of striking the deceased in the head was not only a but-for
cause of death, but that neither the act of rolling the deceased's body
over the cliff nor the weather elements can be correctly described as
superseding events that severed the causal nexus. Having also demon-
strated the requisite causal nexus between the accused's voluntary act of
striking the deceased in the head and the death that followed, the only
remaining issue is whether there was temporal coincidence between the
voluntary act and the requisite mens rea for murder.
As noted earlier, an intention to kill is a sufficient mens rea for murder
and given that the accused did not dispute that the blow to the head was
accompanied by an intention to kill, the common law requirement of
temporal coincidence was satisfied. As the accused did not put forth an
affirmative defence such as self-defence, duress, necessity and the like, it
is apparent that the both the Privy Council and the Australian courts
could have reached the same result in Thabo Meli through the correct
application of English and Australian common law precepts, thereby
obviating the need to resort to the sophistry that prompted the Privy
Council to hold that more than one voluntary act or omission can be
viewed as one if the acts or omissions are interconnected through a
common purpose such as an intent to kill and dispose of the body.'''
The result and reasoning of Thabo Meli were reaffirmed 37 years later
by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 7? v Le Brun.^° In that case, the
court held on facts very similar to those in Thabo Melt^^ that two or more
79 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228.
80 [1991] 4 All ER 673.
81 In Le Brun, the appellant had been arguing with his wife one night and struck her
in the jaw rendering her unconscious. He then picked her up, whether to hide the
body or to carry her home was not clear, but dropped her onto the concrete,
causing her to suffer a skull fracture from which she died.
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volitional acts or omissions could be treated as one continuous act or
omission if the crime consists of a sequence of events that can fairly be
regarded as the same transaction*^—and a causal nexus can be demon-
strated between the initial voluntary act or omission that was accom-
panied by the mens rea and the fatal voluntary act or omission that was
not.*' Although the Court of Criminal Appeal did not expound on the
precise meaning of the requirement of a causal nexus,*'* one would have
to assume that this would require, at a minimum, that a but-for causal
nexus must be proven between the initial and fatal acts. If that assump-
tion is correct, then Le Brun is entirely consonant with the writer's view
that the real issue in Thabo Meli was one of legal causation between the
initial act that was accompanied by the requisite mens rea and the last
and fatal act of rolling the deceased's body over the cliff in the mistaken
belief that the deceased was already dead. As Thabo Meli required that
two or more voluntary acts or omissions be interconnected by a com-
mon purpose*' to kill and dispose of the body in order to be treated as
one continuous act,** it may well be that there is little, if any, difference
between those conditions and the ones enunciated in Le Brun. Indeed, it
would be difficult to envisage a scenario in which the Le Brun criteria
could be satisfied without also meeting the Thabo Meli criteria.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion is not intended to impugn the overall compe-
tence and integrity of the judiciaries in the UK, Australia or any other
western democracy. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence to suggest
that the overwhelming majority of judges and magistrates are anything
other than persons of the utmost integrity and competence. Regrettably,
however, this commentary has demonstrated that members of the judi-
ciary, as with members of any other branch of government or pro-
fession, are not impervious to allowing their objectivity to be
compromised, and particularly so in instances where strict adherence to
well-settled legal principles would lead to results which they perceive to
be contrary to the interests of justice. This sobering reality is further
exacerbated by the fact that the judiciary is no less affiicted by ineptitude
within its ranks than are other branches of government or professions.
The Privy Council's decision in Thabo Meli, subsequently reaffirmed by
the English Court of Appeal in Le Brun, serves as a vivid illustration of
these observations and, more importantly, what they portend for the
public's respect for both the law and the judiciary that is entrusted with
its construction and application.
This raises an obvious question that is as old as it is important; namely,
what can and should be done to curb result-driven decision-making and
its pernicious effects? As is the case with so many difficult issues, the
ease with which this particular problem is stated and identified belies the
82 R vLiBrw« [1991] 4 All ER 673at 678.
83 Ibid, at 678-9.
84 Ibid, at 679.
85 Thabo Meli v The Queen [1954] 1 WLR 228 at 230.
86 Ibid.
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enormous difficulty in articulating and implementing a workable solu-
tion. In searching for a solution to what has long proved to be an
intractable problem, it is often said, with justification, that the best
methodology for finding a solution to an insoluble problem is through
process of elimination; that is, by first ascertaining what proposals will
not rectify the problem. While this may be the most efficacious approach
to finding a resolution to the problems raised in this commentary, there
is no escaping the reality that any proposed solution will only be as
effective as the honesty and integrity of those who administer it. That
said, the degree to which a person is considered to be one of honesty and
integrity is largely within the eyes of the beholder. Indeed, one man's
hero is another man's villain. While such observations are far from
solutions to the problems raised, the above commentary on the Privy
Council's decision in Thabo Meli serves as an important starting point by
poignantly identifying the problems of result-driven decision-making,
judicial ineptitude and the deleterious consequences they engender.
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